In 2020, there were military coups in Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali. The following year, Chad’s army came to power. And in 2023 there were coups in Niger (July), Gabon (September) and a failed coup in Guinea-Bissau (November-December). These coups were supported mostly by the youth. The reasons for the rise of coups in places that had previously embraced multi-party elections include the failure of the governing elites to create an inclusive framework for development, France’s influence on fiscal policy in most of her former colonies and struggling economies. Over the past five years few countries achieved GDP growth higher than 5% and formal sector employment remains a rarity for youths graduating from universities. The number of Africans trying to migrate out of the continent in search of greener pastures is on the rise. Latest data from the World Migration Report suggests that there are about 43 million African migrants overall, with 21 million living in another African country.

By the end of 2023 it seemed as if electoral democracy had come to its premature collapse in Africa. Beyond the coups, several studies were beginning to point towards a waning influence of democracy, especially among the youths. Youths (people under the age of 25) make up 60% of the population, making them the biggest voting cohort. According to an Open Society Foundation study, African youths are less likely to vote, participate in community meetings or contact political leaders compared to those older than 35. According to research by Marjoke Oosterom (2023), young people are frustrated with their ageing leaders and that democracy has not delivered, in particular with respect to generating decent employment. 

It is against this background that the elections of 2024 gave democracy another chance.  Peaceful elections that led to change occurred in Botswana, Ghana, Senegal and South Africa, where the ruling ANC lost its majority for the first time. The elections in Namibia led to the ascension of a female president. 

Election-related upheavals are to be expected in regions where governments have repeatedly failed to deliver on their promises. For example, Mozambique has experienced civil unrest since the election results were announced.  

Democracy has its enduring supporters; there is a desire among African regional bodies such as the African Union and sub-regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West Africa States, Southern African Development Community and East African Community to ensure that multiparty democracy thrives. The AU and sub-regional bodies have invested significantly in developing best practice guidelines on the holding of free and fair elections. Election monitoring and observing has grown as a practice across Africa.

But democracy is costly. The average price of an election in Africa — $4.20 per capita — is twice the world’s average and higher than the $4 spent in Europe, North America and Australia. Estimates show that Sub-Saharan Africa spent almost $50 billion on polls from 2000 to 2018. Despite delivering very little in terms of change, the elections are also a huge drain on the fiscus.

But holding elections is not enough. According to Afrobarometer,  the number of citizens in Africa with little or no confidence in their national electoral commission rose from 41% to 55% from 2011-13 to 2021-23. Elections should not be a ritual of changing power among elites; the electorate is impatient for change. In many instances voters have demonstrated their displeasure with incumbent parties for their failure to ensure economic growth and improve livelihoods. 

At first glance it seems ideological differences no longer exist, given the collapse of Eastern Europe or the Soviet bloc in terms of the ideologies they used to pursue. It may seem as if there is a new consensus that development is going to be carried out using the tools of the West, which is capitalism. But further analysis beyond the surface suggests there are huge ideological concerns and differences across political parties, usually between incumbents and opposition political parties. Opposition politicians have mostly sold a new utopia of an effective government with adequate resourcing and autonomy to quickly transform economies. They make promises to wipe out corruption and state ineffectiveness. The new ideology spreading across Senegal all the way to South Africa is about a new and capable African state responsive to the needs of citizens. 

There is an added dimension in the Francophone belt of “doing away with France”. France has had a huge post-colonial role in terms of the economies of former colonies, through managing the currencies and limiting fiscal autonomy of governments. For instance, the election in Senegal was not just about removing the incumbent, but also about freedom from the control of France. 

Remarkably, personality politics is being replaced by a new issues driven framework. Incumbent political parties that have failed to address electoral promises they made in an earlier cycle, resulting in their disappointment in the polls. The electorate in South Africa did not consider the historical role that the ruling ANC played in the liberation struggle but rather focused on contemporary failures of service delivery, an under-performing economy and widespread corruption in the government. The new political discussions are now focused on performance issues, notably the extent to which governments can deliver on election promises.

Although there is evidence of the deepening of democratic practices on the continent, notably through the embracing of elections as an instrument for changing governments, there is a simultaneous increase of authoritarianism through clamping down of dissent and alleged rigging of election results. In Mozambique, violent protests erupted soon after the announcement of the results. Many dispute the victory of Frelimo’s Daniel Chapo. In Tanzania, a country will hold elections in 2025, opposition leaders have been incarcerated, their rallies have been banned and some 500 activists have been arrested, accused of plotting violence. In Zambia, opposition rallies have been banned and protesters against 17-hour power cuts were arrested. Even after elections, those who have opposed the government agenda and spoken out against authoritarianism have been arrested. 

The belief that elections are a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy rings true as we observe the events on the continent. There is the general thinking especially amongst the electorate, that the elections are a silver bullet, that the elections are going to lead countries to the promised land. This messianic view of elections crowds out other democracy enhancing practices such as broader citizen participation. Perhaps the more worrying trend is that many African countries are in perpetual election mode diverting time and attention from development and post-election citizen engagement practices. It becomes difficult even for the new government to focus on governing without being concerned about winning the next election. 

Dr Tendai Murisa is the executive director of the Sivio Institute, a think tank based in Harare, Zimbabwe

Kagame is not just another leader; he is the architect of present-day Rwanda, similar to the founder of modern Singapore. In 2009, former US president Bill Clinton, called him “one of the greatest leaders of our time” while the former prime minister of the UK, Tony Blair, called him “a visionary”. Understanding Kagame’s enduring popularity requires a deeper introspection into the country’s socio-political context. 

Kagame’s government has successfully leveraged the narrative of national unity and progress post-genocide to maintain control. Perhaps, if the numbers are to be believed, this is what many Rwandese had in mind as they entered the ballot booth. The Rwandese experience stands in stark contrast to countries like Zimbabwe, which also experienced a dark history with its Gukurahundi mass killings but continue to struggle in addressing it.

After the genocide, Rwanda was left with horrific devastation: physical and moral wounds, destroyed property and a decimated justice system, because judges were targeted for being Tutsi. The education system collapsed as teachers were killed, the health system was in ruins and local government was paralyzed. Faced with this dire situation, Kagame implemented home-grown solutions to heal and transform the country. He promoted a culture of community mediation, courts, national leadership and community work to address the problems. For instance, Rwanda’s community courts were successful in tackling impunity in 86.4% of the cases, according to research by the Centre for Conflict Management at the National University of Rwanda. He also ensured that the genocide’s memory was preserved to honour loved ones, restore dignity, give survivors a chance to tell their stories, fight denial and genocidal ideology and educate future generations about the threat of genocide.

Thirty years later, Rwanda has high economic growth, status as a tourist attraction, education for all and equal rights for women. This progress and stability probably informs the support many Rwandans have for Kagame.

But is Kagame that popular? There have been stories in the media about how he seeks to destroy political foes. Michela Wrong, in her book, Do Not Disturb: The Story of a Political Murder and an African Regime Gone Bad, argues that Kagame has ruthlessly hunted down and killed political enemies, suppressed freedom of speech, elections are a farce and, far from being a model for the rest of Africa, the country is an ethnic tinderbox waiting to explode. In the previous polls, the former opposition leader, Diane Rwigara, was imprisoned together with her mother and sister. She was charged with “offences to state security and forgery”. Rwigara was not just another politician, she was a serious contender for power but was barred from contesting the 2017 and 2024 elections.

Furthermore, reflecting on the broader context of global democracy, others have highlighted the growing concern that democracy is under threat worldwide, characterised by increasing authoritarianism and the erosion of democratic norms. How do the Rwandan elections measure up to conditions of fairness and transparency? Does the electoral process mask an underlying autocracy? Many of today’s dictators are elected into office and in some instances are popular for delivering on socio-economic goals. Others have called them “benevolent dictators”. 

The usual measures for democracy include free and fair elections characterised by independent institutions responsible for running elections and adjudicating any conflicts that may arise from the plebiscite. Rwanda was ranked as a “not free” country in 2022 on the Freedom Index. According to the Freedom House, Kagame’s Patriotic Front has also suppressed political dissent through pervasive surveillance, intimidation, torture and renditions or suspected assassinations of exiled dissidents. What shall we make of this? 

True democracy encompasses more than just regular elections; it requires a culture of civility, tolerance and genuine public participation — elements that are often missing in Rwanda’s tightly controlled political landscape. 

While Kagame’s leadership has undeniably brought stability and development to Rwanda, the broader democratic principles of genuine public participation and political pluralism remain unattainable. The challenge for Rwanda, and indeed for many countries worldwide, is to balance effective governance and national unity with the fundamental democratic values of freedom and inclusivity.

Nyasha McBride Mpani is the project leader for the Data for Governance Alliance Project based at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in Cape Town.

Dr Tendai Murisa is the executive director at the independent policy research organisation SIVIO Institute, based in Harare, Zimbabwe.