Alain Delon, 88, French actor, producer and writer who won numerous awards, including the Palme d’Or for the director of the Best Feature Film at the Cannes Film Festival, for his contribution to French and European cinema. Died 18 August.

Alberto Fujimori, 86, president of Peru from 1990 to 2000, who was convicted of ordering military death squads to carry out killings and kidnappings, among other crimes including corruption. Died 11  September.

Alexey Navalny, 47, outspoken opposition leader and Kremlin critic who was poisoned in 2020 and later jailed. The prison service said it was investigating his “sudden death”. Died 16 February.

Aletta Bezuidenhout, 76, award-winning actress, playwright and director. Her plays include Time of Footsteps; her TV serials include The Lady of the Camellias and her films include Country of My Skull. Died 13  February. 

Bob Newhart, 94, known for his understated satire, achieved fame as a stand-up comic and TV star. He received three Grammys, an Emmy, a Golden Globe and the Mark Twain Prize for American Humor. Died 18  July.

Breyten Breytenbach, 85, leading Afrikaner poet and critic of apartheid who spent seven years in prison on terrorism charges and went into exile, becoming a French citizen. Died 24 November.

Chris April, 84, veteran actor from Nyanga who performed alongside stars such as Forest Whitaker and John Kani. He was attacked by robbers and admitted to hospital. Died 31  March.

Cissy Houston, 91, two-time Grammy-winning singer whose career began at the age of five. She recorded 10 solo albums and four compilations. She was the mother of Whitney Houston. Died 7  October. 

Connie Chiume, 72, actress made famous in the US for her role in Black Panther. She received the South African Film and Television Awards’ lifetime achievement award in 2022. Died 6 August.

Dingaan Thobela, 57, three-time world boxing champion known as “The Rose of Soweto”. Died 29 April. 

Donald Sutherland, 88, veteran actor of 60 years who starred in M*A*S*H, Klute and The Hunger Games and received a Primetime Emmy, two Golden Globes, a Bafta, an Academy and an Academy Honorary award. Died 20 June. 

Ebrahim Raisi, 63, cleric, prosecutor (known as the “Butcher of Tehran”) and president of Iran (2021–24), during which time citizens protested after the death of Jina Mahsa Amini, who died in custody for wearing “improper” clothing. Died 19  May.

Edna O’Brien, 93, Irish novelist, short-story writer and screenwriter who wrote among other topics about female sexuality and desire (The Country Girls) and the Troubles (House of Splendid Isolation). Died 27  July.

Ethel Kennedy, 96, human rights advocate to whom Barack Obama awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom for advancing social justice, environmental protection and poverty reduction. Died 10 October.

Fethullah Gülen, 83, Turkish Islamic scholar and spiritual leader of a movement for social and civic reform, the Hizmet (“service”) or Gülen movement. Died 20 October.

Frances Ndlazilwana, 89, actress who played Lydia Maema in the controversial mini-series After Nine and in TV drama series such as 4Play: Sex Tips for Girls, Erfsondes and Diamonds. Died 24 February.

Françoise Hardy, 80, one of France’s most popular singers and a style icon who inspired designers such as Yves Saint Laurent. Her  ballad Tous les Garçons et les Filles launched her career in 1962. Died 11 June.

Franz Beckenbauer, 78, German football player, manager and official nicknamed der Kaiser (the Emperor). Died 7 January.

Gerald “Mac” McKenzie, 72, innovative composer and bassist called the Goema Captain, was the frontman of The Genuines, whose music included the song Die Struggle. Died 29 April.

Gustavo Gutiérrez, 96, influential Peruvian priest who was the father of liberation theology and regarded as a prophet of the poor. Died 22 October.

Hage Geingob, 82, third president of Namibia from 2015 until his death, and prime minister from 1990 to 2002 and from 2012 to 2015. Died 4  February.

Hassan Nasrallah, 64, secretary general of Hezbollah, killed in an Israeli air strike during its bombardment of Lebanon. Died 27 September.

Ismail Haniye, 62, Hamas leader and prime minister of the Palestinian Authority assassinated by a covert Israeli operation in Tehran while there for the inauguration of the Iranian president. Died 31 July.

Ismail Kadare, 88, internationally renowned Albanian novelist and poet. Died 1 July.

James Lawson Jr, 95, American Civil Rights activist who helped devise the movement’s strategy of non-violent protest. Died 9 June.

James Selfe, 68, former Democratic Alliance federal council chairperson. Died 21 May.

Kris Kristofferson, 88, a Rhodes scholar who became a country music star and Hollywood actor. Died 28 September.

Luke Fleurs, 24, a footballer from Mitchells Plain, who played centre-back for Kaizer Chiefs and was called up to play for Bafana Bafana, was shot dead in a hijacking. Died 3 April.

Maggie Smith, 89, British actress whose long career included working with Laurence Olivier in Othello and playing roles in Harry Potter and Downton Abbey. Died 27 September. 

Markus Jooste, 63, former chief executive of Steinhoff International, who allegedly masterminded the huge fraud case. Died 21 March.

Mário Zagallo, 92, four-time Football World Cup winner with Brazil as a player and coach. Died 6  January. 

Mpho Sebeng, 32, actor in productions including Miseducation, Ring of Lies and Collision. Died 5 May.

OJ Simpson, 76, NFL professional and broadcaster who was acquitted of the killings of his former wife Nicole Brown Simpson and her friend Ron Goldman. Died 11 April. 

Peter Higgs, 94, physicist, who in the 1960s developed the theory explaining why the building blocks of the universe have mass. His theory was validated in 2012 at CERN with the detection of the Higgs boson particle, for which he was awarded the 2013 Nobel prize for physics. Died 9  April. 

Peter Magubane, 91, photographer whose images recorded the worst of apartheid and people’s opposition to it. He spent 586 days in solitary confinement, was shot at and his home burnt down. Died 1 January. 

Phil Lesh, 84, the founding member and bassist of the Grateful Dead. Died 25 October.

Pravin Gordhan, 75, anti-apartheid activist who was detained three times and tortured. Post-apartheid, he was the finance minister, South African Revenue Service commissioner and public enterprises minister, and opposed state capture under the Zuma administration. Died 13  September.

Paul Auster, 77, author of The New York Trilogy, Leviathan and 4  3  2  1 and the screenplay for Smoke. He was awarded the Prince of Asturias prize for literature and the Prix Médicis Étranger and was a Commandeur de l’Ordre des Arts et des Lettres. Died 30  April.

Quincy Jones, 91, composer, musician and producer whose style ranged from jazz, swing and pop to soul and funk. He worked with stars such as Count Basie, Dizzy Gillespie, and Michael Jackson and composed soundtracks for film and TV. Died 3  November. 

Ray McCauley, 75, evangelical leader and founder of the Rhema Bible Church. Died 8 October.

Rebecca Cheptegei, 33, Ugandan Olympic marathon runner who was doused in petrol and set on fire by her boyfriend. Died 5 September.

Robin Renwick, 86, British diplomat, author and a member of the House of Lords who served as British ambassador to South Africa from 1987 to 1991. Died 4 November.

Sello Motloung, 54, TV and theatre actor whose work included Human Cargo, uBab’ Stivovo, Master Harold and the Boys and Cold Stone Jug. Died 15  September.

Steven Goldblatt, 67, lawyer and one of the founders of the Weekly Mail (now the Mail & Guardian), who made significant contributions to reforms in various sectors after democracy. Died in May.

Tito Mboweni, 65, democratic South Africa’s first minister of labour, South African Reserve Bank governor and minister of finance. Died 12  October.

Tony Cedras, 72, musician who performed with artists such as Paul Simon, Harry Belafonte, Miriam Makeba, Hugh Masekela and Gigi. Died 29 January.

Tony Heard, 86, former editor of the Cape Times, who opposed the apartheid regime. Died 27 March.

Viktoriia Roshchyna, 27, journalist, detained in a part of Ukraine occupied by Russia. The defence ministry in Moscow gave the death date as 19  September but no cause of death.

Violet Sizani Siwela, 68, member of the ANC’s national executive committee, the National Assembly and of the Mpumalanga legislature. Died 18  January.

Willem Heath, 79, a judge appointed by Nelson Mandela to head the commission of inquiry into maladministration and corruption in the Eastern Cape, from which he became the founding head of the Special Investigating Unit.

Yahya Sinwar, 62, a Hamas leader killed by Israeli troops during a gun battle in southern Gaza. He spent 22 years in an Israeli prison until his release in a prisoner swap. Died 16  October.

Sources: Encyclopaedia Britannica, The Guardian, Al Jazeera, BBC, TimesLive

In 2020, there were military coups in Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali. The following year, Chad’s army came to power. And in 2023 there were coups in Niger (July), Gabon (September) and a failed coup in Guinea-Bissau (November-December). These coups were supported mostly by the youth. The reasons for the rise of coups in places that had previously embraced multi-party elections include the failure of the governing elites to create an inclusive framework for development, France’s influence on fiscal policy in most of her former colonies and struggling economies. Over the past five years few countries achieved GDP growth higher than 5% and formal sector employment remains a rarity for youths graduating from universities. The number of Africans trying to migrate out of the continent in search of greener pastures is on the rise. Latest data from the World Migration Report suggests that there are about 43 million African migrants overall, with 21 million living in another African country.

By the end of 2023 it seemed as if electoral democracy had come to its premature collapse in Africa. Beyond the coups, several studies were beginning to point towards a waning influence of democracy, especially among the youths. Youths (people under the age of 25) make up 60% of the population, making them the biggest voting cohort. According to an Open Society Foundation study, African youths are less likely to vote, participate in community meetings or contact political leaders compared to those older than 35. According to research by Marjoke Oosterom (2023), young people are frustrated with their ageing leaders and that democracy has not delivered, in particular with respect to generating decent employment. 

It is against this background that the elections of 2024 gave democracy another chance.  Peaceful elections that led to change occurred in Botswana, Ghana, Senegal and South Africa, where the ruling ANC lost its majority for the first time. The elections in Namibia led to the ascension of a female president. 

Election-related upheavals are to be expected in regions where governments have repeatedly failed to deliver on their promises. For example, Mozambique has experienced civil unrest since the election results were announced.  

Democracy has its enduring supporters; there is a desire among African regional bodies such as the African Union and sub-regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West Africa States, Southern African Development Community and East African Community to ensure that multiparty democracy thrives. The AU and sub-regional bodies have invested significantly in developing best practice guidelines on the holding of free and fair elections. Election monitoring and observing has grown as a practice across Africa.

But democracy is costly. The average price of an election in Africa — $4.20 per capita — is twice the world’s average and higher than the $4 spent in Europe, North America and Australia. Estimates show that Sub-Saharan Africa spent almost $50 billion on polls from 2000 to 2018. Despite delivering very little in terms of change, the elections are also a huge drain on the fiscus.

But holding elections is not enough. According to Afrobarometer,  the number of citizens in Africa with little or no confidence in their national electoral commission rose from 41% to 55% from 2011-13 to 2021-23. Elections should not be a ritual of changing power among elites; the electorate is impatient for change. In many instances voters have demonstrated their displeasure with incumbent parties for their failure to ensure economic growth and improve livelihoods. 

At first glance it seems ideological differences no longer exist, given the collapse of Eastern Europe or the Soviet bloc in terms of the ideologies they used to pursue. It may seem as if there is a new consensus that development is going to be carried out using the tools of the West, which is capitalism. But further analysis beyond the surface suggests there are huge ideological concerns and differences across political parties, usually between incumbents and opposition political parties. Opposition politicians have mostly sold a new utopia of an effective government with adequate resourcing and autonomy to quickly transform economies. They make promises to wipe out corruption and state ineffectiveness. The new ideology spreading across Senegal all the way to South Africa is about a new and capable African state responsive to the needs of citizens. 

There is an added dimension in the Francophone belt of “doing away with France”. France has had a huge post-colonial role in terms of the economies of former colonies, through managing the currencies and limiting fiscal autonomy of governments. For instance, the election in Senegal was not just about removing the incumbent, but also about freedom from the control of France. 

Remarkably, personality politics is being replaced by a new issues driven framework. Incumbent political parties that have failed to address electoral promises they made in an earlier cycle, resulting in their disappointment in the polls. The electorate in South Africa did not consider the historical role that the ruling ANC played in the liberation struggle but rather focused on contemporary failures of service delivery, an under-performing economy and widespread corruption in the government. The new political discussions are now focused on performance issues, notably the extent to which governments can deliver on election promises.

Although there is evidence of the deepening of democratic practices on the continent, notably through the embracing of elections as an instrument for changing governments, there is a simultaneous increase of authoritarianism through clamping down of dissent and alleged rigging of election results. In Mozambique, violent protests erupted soon after the announcement of the results. Many dispute the victory of Frelimo’s Daniel Chapo. In Tanzania, a country will hold elections in 2025, opposition leaders have been incarcerated, their rallies have been banned and some 500 activists have been arrested, accused of plotting violence. In Zambia, opposition rallies have been banned and protesters against 17-hour power cuts were arrested. Even after elections, those who have opposed the government agenda and spoken out against authoritarianism have been arrested. 

The belief that elections are a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy rings true as we observe the events on the continent. There is the general thinking especially amongst the electorate, that the elections are a silver bullet, that the elections are going to lead countries to the promised land. This messianic view of elections crowds out other democracy enhancing practices such as broader citizen participation. Perhaps the more worrying trend is that many African countries are in perpetual election mode diverting time and attention from development and post-election citizen engagement practices. It becomes difficult even for the new government to focus on governing without being concerned about winning the next election. 

Dr Tendai Murisa is the executive director of the Sivio Institute, a think tank based in Harare, Zimbabwe

With most landfills in Africa being simply uncontrolled dumpsites, an average waste collection rate of just 55% and a population set to double by 2050, we are in serious trouble as a continent if we do not implement urgent and clear local, national and regional and national action plans to support sustainable waste management practices.

The plastic pollution problem in Africa is more nuanced than those faced by other regions, primarily because of the continent’s rapid development, population growth and our diverse economic groups with varying needs and challenges. 

Large coastal countries like South Africa and Egypt face different waste-management challenges to small island states, such as Mauritius, or landlocked countries like Lesotho. 

We know that municipal solid-waste collection services in most African countries are inadequate and, as our population continues to grow, waste generation is fast outpacing collection and management capacity.

The UN Environment Programme has spearheaded a global effort to address plastic pollution with the Global Plastic Treaty, which sets the framework for action plans that all signatory countries must submit to the treaty’s appointment body. Although the treaty has yet to be finalised, the response and involvement from African nations has been limited, primarily because of the complexity that is innate to the waste-management and plastics sector.

The plastics issue is not considered a priority for many impoverished communities, where meeting basic survival needs is a daily challenge.

As a response to the continent’s unique problems, the Sustainable Seas Trust, a South African marine conservation organisation with an African mandate, has developed Plastic-Free Seas: An Action-Focused Guide for Plastic Management in Africa. The guidebook, developed in collaboration with industry experts across the globe, provides a clear framework and downloadable, editable templates to help African nations draft specific plastic waste-management action plans. 

A complementary resource to the Plastic-Free Seas Guidebook, the African Resource Book Series, has also been developed as a more technical, but comprehensive, A-Z guide for plastics, from production to management to existing policies in Africa.

The guidebook recognises that not all African countries are the same, with templates designed to be adaptable, ensuring that each country can customise its plan to its specific economic and geographical context. 

Through consultation with stakeholders from across the continent over a two-year period, Sustainable Seas Trust aims to ensure the voices and perspectives of those most affected by plastic pollution are reflected and the practical tools provided make sense within an African context. 

Showcasing the need for, and benefit of, different approaches to tackling this global issue, it is a flexible and action-focused “how to” that provides a structured approach to the cross-cutting issues of education, consumer behaviour change, fiscal incentives and recycling markets. 

Harmonised regional approaches aligned with national strategies will allow neighbouring countries to share resources and solutions, create regional markets for recycled materials and design effective, mandatory extended producer responsibility schemes.

National action plans must be tailored to reflect each country’s individual economic, societal and environmental circumstances, while city action plans will comprise the biggest lever of change. Prioritising investment in towns and cities to support sustainable waste management will yield the greatest return, as they are the most densely populated, producing the bulk of a country’s plastic waste.

Solutions provided by these action plans must address the full lifecycle of plastics, from production and consumption, to end-of-life disposal including recycling. 

Supporting every step of the plastic value chain — including mining and refining of raw materials; design and manufacturing; packaging and shipping; retail and the use, discarding and recycling of the product — through training and provision of adequate and appropriate resources, is an absolute imperative for reducing waste. 

Africa has an opportunity to not only address the plastic pollution crisis in a way that fulfils its obligations to the UN Global Plastics Treaty, but also to drive a transformative shift towards a more resource-efficient, resilient, equitable and inclusive African blue economy. 

By drawing up decisive action plans now we, as Africans, can leverage our stage of development to chart a new path, one that turns sustainable plastic waste-management and effective recycling into an engine of economic growth, societal transformation, income-generating opportunities and environmental sustainability — for the benefit of our oceans and all who depend on them.

A future free of plastic pollution is not a future free from plastic. It is, however, a future where plastic is valued and is produced according to design principles that ensures that, when it is sent for recycling, it will be made into a new and useful product. 

It is a future where plastics are kept within the circular economy at its highest value and at the lowest cost to the consumer. It is a future where the people of Africa and her seas flourish together.

Janine Osborne is the chief executive officer of the Sustainable Seas Trust.

From what I can see, eThekwini metro is taking a feather out of the City of Cape Town’s cap, because it is now moving and shaking. 

Durban has one of the busiest ports in the country, and its conference centre is blowing up with bookings when it comes to the corporate side of things. 

With its sandy beaches, great year-round climate and warm ocean, I think Durban should be one of our top destinations in the country for business and leisure. 

But Durbs is often in the news for all the wrong things: crime, the 2021 riots and accompanying destruction to severe floods and polluted water that causes high E. coli counts and the closure of beaches. If the perception of Durban, along with infrastructure, crime prevention and service delivery, can be improved, this location can boom. 

Albeit busy, the Durban port is seriously congested and needs attention. That was on the cards but will have to wait until the high court decides next year whether the losing bidder, APM Terminals, or International Container Terminal Services, which won the bid, will proceed with investing millions in upgrades and new equipment at the port. And it will take time to turn Transnet, the state-owned logistics company, around.

But a notable deal that was recently closed concerns the much-needed rejuvenation of the iconic beachfront property Joe Cool’s at 137  Marine Parade. eThekwini has appointed a company to redevelop the site on a 45-year lease agreement. For non-Durbanites, Joe Cool’s was the coolest place to be in its heyday. 

eThekwini is on a mission to release the potential of state-owned real estate. Its proactive land release strategy, along with a detailed RFP (request for proposals) for the beachfront redevelopment opened the door to industry professionals in November 2022. 

The tender was granted to Imvusa Trading 595 CC, which will begin construction early next year after the necessary approvals have been achieved. The municipality has said the beachfront redevelopment will create 80 jobs during the construction period. 

eThekwini’s mayor, Cyril Xaba, has emphasised that they will guarantee the retention of all current jobs, and new positions will also be established because the new site will be 68% bigger than the existing one. The redevelopment will bring in new tenants, including a Mugg & Bean restaurant, while retaining the existing tenants such as Wimpy, Steers, Fishaways and Milky Lane.

The municipality also has plans to redevelop the old Funworld site. Its formal announcement of these plans will be published soon.

Investment flows where confidence goes and Southern Sun will also make some major moves. The group was awarded a 50-year lease and it will invest R1  billion in the rejuvenation of the Elangeni and Maharani hotels. The current lease was set to end in December 2025. This was an essential move by the municipality, especially when jobs are concerned — the two hotels employ about 500 people and these jobs are now safe. 

I spoke to Thapelo E Mmusinyane, the head of real estate for the eThekwini municipality. He says when they released these hotel properties to the market for tender, the number of responses received was the highest ever. This shows the keen confidence from investors who want to get stuck in and revive these iconic assets in Durban.

He also mentioned that eThekwini has put into action initiatives to attract investment and foster growth. One is the economic development incentive policy, which seeks to facilitate and create a supportive environment for new investments while maintaining existing ones. 

This initiative provides property rates relief to eligible businesses and developments that contribute to local economic growth, job creation and infrastructure development. As a result of this policy intervention, the municipality has secured R217  billion in ongoing investment developments, with additional projects planned that are expected to generate about 300  000 jobs.

eThekwini is the only municipality in the country offering a property rates reduction incentive to property developers and owners. I am certain that property players will welcome the incentive with open arms, especially because rates have been soaring higher than inflation over the past 10 years. 

“Some of these projects are key drivers in promoting new developments, particularly in strategic growth areas like the north — where Oceans Umhlanga, Sibaya Coastal Precinct, Brickworks and Whetstone Business Park are located — and the west, where some of the industrial developments like Cato Ridge dry port, Keystone Park, Giba Business Estate and the Westown mixed use development are located,” Mmusinyane said.

eThekwini signed a memorandum of understanding with the national department of public works to release surplus properties and land that it does not need to drive development. The Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa has already released stations in the municipality jurisdiction. 

This makes so much sense for the sustainability of a municipality. Why sell the goose that lays the golden egg? In this case, the goose is prime real estate assets, and the egg is income from the property. 

In September this year, eThekwini released 34 out of 149 properties for tender. The target for this financial year is 50 — all with the goal of retaining asset ownership, partnering with a developer to make them modern and functional, and turning Durban into a key tourism node. 

Some of the other famous leased landmark properties advertised for redevelopment in September were Kings Park Stadium and the Durban Country Club, which will be hosting the Investec South Africa Open Championships in 2025. 

“The awarded properties have a capital investment pipeline of R4  billion with R1.4  billion of that earmarked for the beachfront alone and which will create a total of 1  500 jobs during construction and 5  500 jobs post construction,” Mmusinyane said.

The beachfront’s Golden Mile plays a crucial role when it comes to tourism assets. The municipality is working to restore this city’s shine by protecting and enhancing this area. It would be wonderful to see the strip transformed back to its former glory and I think the Durban metro is on a mission to do exactly that. 

I was pleasantly surprised when I saw the stern approach that the municipality took when it forced the legendary Hilton Hotel to reopen. The Hilton Durban shut down during the Covid-19 pandemic when the lockdowns devastated the hospitality sector. The International Convention Centre was also hit, which affected the Hilton Durban.

This led to eThekwini almost expropriating the Hilton Hotel. The municipality has a condition in the title deed that if the hotel stops operating as a five-star hotel, the municipality has the option to buy it back. Upon evoking this condition, the hotel owner reopened the hotel to avoid losing it. 

It’s unfortunate that more municipalities don’t have leases with clauses like these in place. Such agreements would significantly help ensure the smooth operation of hotels — especially those occupying prime real estate such as the mothballed Hyatt Hotel in Rosebank. 

eThekwini has 565  070 properties in its portfolio, valued at R704  billion, according to Statistics South Africa.

Durban has a lot of vacant land, some of which is protected for environmental purposes. 

About 68% of the municipality’s land is classified as “rural.” The communal land under the Ingonyama Trust is included in this. The remaining 32% comprises residential, commercial and industrial areas. 

Mmusinyane mentioned that eThekwini has decided not to sell its municipal-owned properties unless it will be used for gap housing. 

The municipality has ambitious plans to achieve R1  billion in net property income annually. It owns 9% of the property in its jurisdiction. If eThekwini continues with its current strategy — bringing properties to market when lease agreements expire — they will maintain market-related rentals and enhance their revenue stream, thus ensuring financial sustainability for the municipality. Viva, Durban.

Ask Ash is a column that examines South Africa’s property, architecture and living spaces. Continue the conversation with her on email (ash@askash.co.za) and X (@askashbroker)

The decision not to implement clauses 4 and 5 sparked significant debate. These clauses aimed to address the critical issues of language and  policies in public schools — two areas that directly influence access to education for children, particularly those from underprivileged communities. Although the agreement may be seen as a victory by certain parties, it jeopardises the fundamental rights of the most vulnerable children in our education system.

Clause 4 sought to give the head of the provincial department of education the authority to oversee and, where necessary, amend a public school’s language policy. The intention is to ensure that language policies do not create barriers to entry or exclude children based on their linguistic background.

This clause is a vital step toward fostering inclusivity. Restrictive language policies disproportionately affect children from rural and township areas. These policies often alienate children who are not proficient in the dominant language of instruction, impeding their ability to learn, develop and thrive.

Early childhood education is particularly affected, because language plays a crucial role in developing cognitive, social and emotional skills. We have seen how inclusive language policies — where children are taught in their home language while gradually transitioning to a second language — build confidence and set children up for success.

By rejecting clause 4, the opportunity to address these issues and ensure equitable access to education for all children, regardless of their linguistic background, has been missed.

Clause 5 is aimed to give the provincial head of department final authority over public schools’ admission policies, ensuring they are fair, non-discriminatory and reflective of the constitutional right to education. This clause is aimed to prevent schools from using restrictive admission policies to exclude children based on socioeconomic, geographical or linguistic factors.

Many children in underprivileged communities are denied access to quality education because of admission policies that fail to consider their unique circumstances. In many cases, such policies reinforce inequality by favouring learners from affluent backgrounds or specific language groups, leaving others behind.

While some stakeholders view clause 5 as infringing on the autonomy of school governing bodies, it was designed to protect children’s rights and ensure  equity  in school admissions. By choosing not to implement this clause, we risk perpetuating cycles of exclusion and inequality, particularly in schools where resources and opportunities are limited.

The focus should always be on the child and their right to quality education. But this settlement has shifted the focus to adult-centred concerns, leaving the children on the sidelines. 

Teachers are already overburdened, and centralising admission policies could add layers of administrative strain. This approach risks overlooking the specific needs of communities and the best interests of the children.

Clauses 4 and 5 represent pathways to creating a more inclusive and equitable education system in South Africa. By ensuring fair language and admission policies, these clauses aim to address the barriers that prevent underprivileged children from receiving quality education.

The decision to abandon these clauses may leave many children, particularly those in rural and township schools, vulnerable to exclusion. Language barriers and restrictive admissions will continue to hinder children’s ability to learn and thrive, exacerbating existing inequalities in our education system.

Education policies should prioritise the best interests of children. The current possible settlement may address the concerns of unions and other stakeholders, but it fails to centre the conversation on the children who are most affected. Quality education is a constitutional right for every child, and any decisions that affect access to this right must place children’s needs above all else.

The government, unions and civil society must re-examine how we can collectively address the problems posed by language and admission policies. The Bela Act, with its inclusive intentions, presented a pathway to bridging divides and creating equitable opportunities for children across South Africa.

Although this possible settlement may conclude the current debate, the work is far from over. We must find new ways to ensure that every child — regardless of their language or background — has access to the quality education they deserve.

Barriers must be broken down to build a future where education is a right, not a privilege. 

Theresa Michael is the chief executive of Afrika Tikkun Bambanani.

Fernando Morais’ Lula, a new biography, opens with all the intensity of the moment before the dénouement in a John le Carré novel. On the afternoon of Thursday 5 April 2018, “a listless workday” at the Lula Institute in São Paulo, news came through that a warrant for Lula’s arrest had been issued.

As the media rushed to the institute on motorcycles and in cars and helicopters crowds of people followed. Some were there to defend Lula and others to gloat at his imminent arrest. The first skirmish left a man unconscious and bleeding from a head wound.

Inside the institute it was quickly decided to take Lula to the metalworkers’ union hall 20 kilometres away. Lula was rushed out of a side door and driven through crowds kicking at the car, hitting it with Brazilian flags on poles, shooting fireworks and chanting “Lula the thief” as helicopters flew dangerously low. The convoy that followed Lula carried João Pedro Stédile and João Paulo Rodrigues, leaders of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, the Landless Rural Workers’ Movement.

As the convoy arrived at the union hall hundreds of workers, along with activists, intellectuals and artists, opened a path for Lula. Guilherme Boulos, a philosopher and leader of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto (MTST), the urban Homeless Workers’ Movement and the Partido Socialismo e Liberdade, the Socialism and Liberty Party, a left-wing off-shoot of the PT, rushed to the hall. On the way he called the leaders of a nearby MTST-aligned land occupation that housed 8  000 families. An assembly was called and a proposal to march to the union hall approved.

It didn’t take long before there were more than 10  000 people outside the hall including “intellectuals, TV and movie actors, nuns, rappers”, Morais writes.

Two days later Lula, wishing to avoid a violent confrontation between the police and his supporters, surrendered and was taken to prison. The trumped-up corruption charges on which he had been jailed were annulled on 8 March 2021.

South African readers of Morais’ biography will, inevitably, be reminded of the evening of 7 July 2021 when Jacob Zuma was, at the last minute, rushed from Nkandla to Estcourt to begin serving a prison sentence.

As in Brazil three years earlier, international media had scrambled to cover a tense situation as a former president was about to be jailed. Like Lula, Zuma had emerged from impoverished rural origins to develop personal charisma and become president through a struggle against an oppressive regime.

Both men had been subject to sustained hostility from white-dominated and stridently Western-aligned media prior to their convictions. In both cases the coalitions that took to the streets against a former president were entirely or largely elite-driven coalitions.

But the scenes outside Zuma’s home in Nkandla were very different to the scenes outside the union hall in São Paulo. The few hundred people gathered in support of Zuma did not include the mass-based organisations of the working class and the poor, most of which were intensely hostile to Zuma.

A good number of the men strutting around in military uniforms and claiming to be veterans of the ANC’s military wing, uMkhonto weSizwe, had clearly been born after the end of apartheid. In the days before Zuma’s deadline to report to the prison in Estcourt they had been wrecking migrant-owned stalls in central Durban hoping to spark another round of xenophobic violence.

Carl Niehaus, a cartoonishly opportunistic and unprincipled person, was, to use a valuable term in the South African lexicon, talking kak to the cameras.

To the extent that there was any appearance of intellectual support for Zuma, it largely came from Andile Mngxitama. Once a promising young intellectual, Mngxitama had degenerated into backing Shepherd Bushiri, the evangelical preacher notorious for badly staged “miracles”. He had also recently repeated conspiracy theories drawn from Trumpian politics in the United States, including the paranoia around 5G and the claim that Bill Gates was using Covid vaccines to insert “tracking devices” into people.

The differences between Lula and Zuma’s records in office were equally glaring. Unlike Lula, Zuma had been grossly corrupt. During Lula’s period in office 40 million people were lifted out of poverty and extreme poverty declined by 50% among many other achievements. Zuma’s record was miserable.

Lula’s charisma was, as John French’s brilliant 2020 biography shows, endowed by a movement and forged through reciprocal relations in concerted actions “based on recognition of a linked fate and shared hope”. It has and continues to summon people, often organised in unions and popular movements that build collective power, into political contestation.

Zuma’s political formation was in the military and intelligence and his charisma is partly that of the man who gives orders and partly that of the man who invites libidinal identification with his disinhibition. It has a strong revanchist element, promises to restore old hierarchies and calls people into acceptance of his authority rather than independent organisation and action. 

Unlike older forms of conservativism, it also, much like the charisma of Donald Trump or Jair Bolsonaro, holds the promise of sanction for anti-social behaviour. Zuma’s charisma is also regionally concentrated and, as the results of recent by-elections in KwaZulu-Natal and his failure to fill the Moses Mabhida Stadium show, in decline.

Both men are outsiders — born poor, denied formal education and reviled by old elites. But Lula’s charisma is harnessed to a democratic project of expanding social inclusion, in contrast, Zuma’s charisma speaks in the name of the people while being weaponised by a predatory counter-elite.

There was a moment when South Africa and Brazil seemed to some to be set on similar paths. In both countries strikes were a significant turning point in struggles against oppressive regimes. In South Africa, the Durban strikes in 1973 opened the way to the development of popular counter-power in the country, popular power that would grow to the point of forcing the state into a corner. 

In Brazil, the strikes by metalworkers near São Paulo in 1979 marked the beginning of the end of the military dictatorship.

A direct connection between these two national struggles developed when, in 1971, Steve Biko set up workshops to train activists in the pedagogic methods developed by Paulo Freire in Brazil. Freire’s ideas, grounded in a dialogical approach to education that encourages critical thinking, reflection and active participation, were later brought into thinking about praxis in the trade union movement, and then the United Democratic Front.

These ideas, premised on mutual respect, were an important element of the thinking about praxis that enabled many university-trained intellectuals in the 1970s and 1980s to productively engage popular movements and struggles.

Much of this has eroded, and South Africa lacks the scale, depth and intensity of popular organisation seen in Brazil. The left remains constrained — either by its subordination to elite nationalism or its own dogmatism, sectarianism, high tolerance for paranoia and conspiracy theory and occasional thuggery.

There are many valuable criticisms of Lula and his party. As things stand, the deep political divisions in Brazil and a hostile Congress leave little room for his gift for forging broad coalitions to flourish. Expectations for his current term must be tempered. 

Nonetheless, the contrast between Lula and Zuma highlights just how much was lost when the work of building popular democratic power was largely abandoned in South Africa. 

Richard Pithouse is a distinguished research fellow at the Global Centre for Advanced Studies in Dublin and New York, an international research scholar at the University of Connecticut and an extraordinary professor at the University of the Western Cape.

“Val’umgodi. Close the hole. Bury them alive. Smoke them out.” Government ministers seeking popularity after losing an election abandon their principles and the Constitution they have sworn to uphold. They chant death. The values of politicians are a sun-dried carcass. Even the flies take no interest. 

This zama zama catastrophe is occurring in slow motion and most of the citizenry want death to speed up. Every day, more bodies are lifted out of the mining tunnels of Stilfontein in North West. Let it be placed on record that a massacre is underway in the belly of the old mining belt. 

Like most occurrences in late capitalism, this is a complicated moment. But most of us refuse the nuance and latch onto expedient explanations that we hope will make our lives easier. 

We live on land on which colonial theft, apartheid atrocities and extractive exploitation has occurred. Mining land is haunted by these ghosts of history. 

They will always be complicated. Living on land abused by racial capitalism will never be easy. It is akin to residing on a cemetery. 

Because we are blaming, perhaps, let us draw the net of complicity. There are the mining barons, and colonial and apartheid authoritarian governments that exploited millions of black people to build the mining industry that built this country. There are the late and post-apartheid governments that did not hold mining houses responsible for not closing old mines as they should have. 

We have governments that thrive on surplus populations of desperate unemployed people. Systems that allow mass inequalities where we can have some of the world’s richest people alongside its poorest. 

It is common cause for most people that artisanal miners terrorise the people who live alongside exhausted mines and waste dunes. 

They generally operate as a shady extra-legal force in a single-minded drive to survive even if this means stealing, killing and damaging neighbouring infrastructure. 

But these miners are the ghosts of history. They form a long chain of millions of people who have been the cheap labour of mining houses since the late 1800s when gold mining began in earnest in South Africa. 

It is unsurprising that many of the dead and “illegals” being lifted from the mining tunnels are Mozambicans. As Charles van Onselen’s The Night Trains: Moving Mozambican Miners To and From the Witwatersrand Mines, 1902-1955 tells us, Mozambicans were the largest group of people working in South African mines. They are in large part responsible for the very profits used to build the infrastructure we want to protect today. 

In our mines, Mozambicans have for generations worked and died in mine falls and terrible working conditions cheek by jowl with Zimbabweans, Malawians, Basotho, Swati and those from South Africa’s homelands including the former Transkei. 

The standoff between zama zama leaders now underground for more than a month without sunlight, toilets or healthcare and the police who guard the mouths of the tunnels has variously appalled and entertained the South African public. 

In early December, an artisanal miner addressed the media in isi­Xhosa. He said many of those underground are South African. He spoke of the adolescents driven underground by the desperation of impoverishment and their vulnerability in the dark pits of the earth. 

He was making the point that if we were killing under the ruse of the expendable lives of “foreigners”, then he wanted it on record that desperate South Africans were also among those in the death tunnels and that teenagers were being smoked out and were among the emaciated bodies drawn up by rope. 

Those scavenging the wastes of capital share blackness and impoverishment. The doing word for how to make people poor and desperate is impoverishment. 

I write this piece on the day that we woke to the news that a note attached to one of the miners forced up the tunnels towards the sunlight listed things wanted by those underground. Among the items requested was tomato sauce and mayonnaise. 

Radio talk shows and social media erupted with incredulity. How could illegals demand luxuries, they asked. Our police and state are fools to negotiate with criminals, they asserted. Radio hosts and listeners laughed at the brazenness of these miners. Our Human Rights Commission has become a tool for illegality, they contended. The refrain is that the commission is a symptom of too many rights in this country. 

The commission has become unpopular. Perhaps they too should turn away in the face of expendable death. Black aliens or illegals are not regarded as human. We know this from the endemic Afrophobia and its eruptions. 2008 saw our cities lined with white tents after illegals were smoked out. This remains an itchy blemish. An erupting cancer. 

After living dangerously in dark, gaseous tunnels, without bathing, on scraps of food and limited drinking water supply for more than month, the wretched cannot ask for mayonnaise. They watch their peers die and then sit with the corpses. On the eve of the Christmas holidays, tomato sauce and mayonnaise have become the breaking point of our brittle humanity. Surely, now that they have requested mayonnaise, they should all die. Should poisonous gas be leaked into the tunnels? 

And after the hundreds of people currently underground die, what will we do with those who replace them? Kill them too? In our characteristic way, we will not attend to the demonic grounds bequeathed to us by colonial, apartheid and late racial capitalist regimes. 

To reckon with the scale of the problem, we must attend to the genocidal histories and ecologies of mining. Black people have been compelled deep underground to mine for gold for 150 years. After gold mining became obsolete and mining barons and parasitic governments pocketed the surplus wealth, these people and their families were abandoned. 

Today, rural areas in Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho and the Eastern Cape are zones of abandonment. Places of broken dreams and maimed generations of miners who returned home to die or were buried in underground tremors and their mine falls. As a child of Lusikisiki in the 1980s, I remember the smell of tuberculosis and Aids offloaded from the buses. I was there when we buried the miners. And now, descendants watch the sun set on empty stomachs. 

Without replacement industries, artisanal miners scavenge the left­over wastes. They continue an unbroken 150-year trail into the tunnels of the mines that crisscross the Highveld. No smoking them out will solve the wrongs of more than a century. Even mayonnaise is not enough. 

Hugo Canham is a writer and professor at Unisa. He writes in his personal capacity and is the author of Riotous Deathscapes.

Arguably the biggest surprise came in India, where Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party lost its majority. No serious analyst or polling organisation had predicted such an outcome. 

In Japan, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party lost its majority for the first time since 2009. In the United Kingdom, the Conservatives suffered their worst election result since 1832. 

The centralist alliance in France, of which President Emmanuel Macron is the pivotal figure, fell more than 14  percentage points, outflanked to the left and right. Its ambitious minority government fell inside three months. 

And the Democrats were emphatically defeated in the United States — not only did Donald Trump win back the White House but the Republicans now control both the Senate and the House of Representatives. 

Closer to home, in Botswana, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party, which had governed since the country’s independence in 1966, was voted out of power, while in Namibia, Swapo — the dominant party since Namibia’s independence in 1990 — fell within three seats of losing a majority that stood at 87% just five years ago. 

Since the Covid-19 pandemic hit in 2020, incumbents have been removed from office in 40 of 54 elections in Western democracies. Rob Ford, professor of political science at the University of Manchester, has referred to it as “a kind of electoral long Covid” — shrewdly linking the plight of incumbents to the inflationary consequences of the pandemic, the dark shadow of history casting itself icily overhead. 

Pandemic, inflation, economic depression, the rise of fascism, World War. The story of the 1920s and 1930s on repeat mode now: not so much a sleepwalk as a blind march into another abyss. Can the centre hold this time? 

Anti-European Union, far-right parties made significant gains in the elections for the European parliament, at the expense of pro-EU moderates. More alarmingly, in the September state elections in the east German state of Thuringia, the Alternative for Germany became the first far-right party since the Nazi era to win a plurality of seats in a German state election. 

In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally Party garnered the highest share of French votes in the European parliament elections, obtaining 31%, and now looks well on track to win the presidency in 2027. 

But sclerotic old Europe does not necessarily reflect the global equilibrium point. There are reasons to be more sanguine about the state of democracy in other parts of the world, not least South Africa, where support for the ANC fell from 57.2% to 40.2%. Nonetheless, it calmly accepted the loss of its 30-year grip on majority rule. 

Not even the pollster Wayne Sussman, whose opinion poll the weekend before election day had Jacob Zuma’s uMkhonto weSizwe party at 14%, believed what he saw. It was another highly unpredictable outcome. 

Yet, it turned into an admirably tranquil “second transition”; the end of ANC dominion passed without so much as a whiff of complaint about electoral rigging or trying to hang on desperately to power. This should not be underestimated. 

There were tense moments in the days that followed, but thanks to a usefully tight constitutional timetable that focused minds, a power-sharing deal between (in the main) centralist parties was done. 

The dismal assortment of thieves and populist demagogues were pushed to the periphery — at least for the time being. 

But the political calendar waits for no one. This time next year we will be less than a year away from the next local government election and the main protagonists will be sharpening their arrows ahead of what will no doubt be seen as a referendum on the government of national unity (GNU). 

This, in turn, will feed into the national conference of the ANC a year later, at the end of 2027. So far, the internal polling of both the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA) is encouraging to both parties: the electorate seems happy with the way in which the leaders of the respective parties played the cards that the electorate dealt them on 29 May. 

This is a — probably the — critical factor. 

If either party senses that the power-sharing arrangement is hurting them electorally, then the incentive to remain in it diminishes greatly and the impetus for an anti-GNU — or, rather, anti the “grand coalition” with the DA — grows concomitantly, and the chance of a centralist moderate being elected by the December 2027 ANC national congress as the successor to Ramaphosa fades. 

Given the state of many municipalities across the country, it could be carnage for the ANC. Will the DA really want to be sharing power with such a party at that moment, perceived to be propping it up in power in the national sphere? 

The temptation to create distance will be strong. It will require steady nerves, on all sides. Just as in those fetid days of early June when the negotiations see-sawed their way towards their precarious conclusion, real leadership will need to be shown — leadership that puts the long-term interests of the country ahead of the short-term interests of both individual politicians and their organisations, which is asking a lot. Perhaps too much. 

In the meantime, the DA will probably stick around. 

One should not underestimate the pull of real power. DA leader John Steenhuisen is now in the cabinet. After years in opposition this is a very alluring turn of events: the blue light security detail; the first class travel; the sumptuous Beijing banquets and the fascinating encounter with your Chinese opposite number; the hand-shaking and the bilateral agreement; a sense of doing something. 

It’s hard to walk away. But the DA now also has two centres of power. There is strategic distance between all that and the woman who remains the hard-nosed power behind the throne — Helen Zille — an image that a recent spate of hard-hitting interviews is clearly intended to reinforce. Her job is to keep her eye on the long-term interests of her party, balanced with those of the country, and the managerial responsibilities of running a competitive party organisation. 

How much actual power the DA has in the GNU is a matter of debate and contestation. The precise meaning of clause 19.3 of the statement of intent that was hastily signed — initially between just the ANC and the DA — on the morning of the first sitting of the new National Assembly in June, will need to be clarified. 

Clause 19.3 states that when consensus cannot be found among all of the coalition parties, decisions can be made by “sufficient consensus”, which is defined as agreement between parties in the GNU that represent 60% of the seats in the National Assembly. Only the ANC and DA can mathematically meet that 60% threshold.

The ANC’s leadership is denying the obvious implication of this clause — or, perhaps better put, is in denial. Since a combination of cowardice and ambition will prevent ANC secretary general Fikile Mbalula from admitting to his compadres that he signed a deal that gives the DA a veto power over cabinet decisions, another way of confirming the correct interpretation of the disputed clause will have to be found. 

Otherwise the DA might just find itself with no alternative but to walk away if the ANC plays too fast and loose with the agreement and its relationship with the DA inside cabinet. 

Which is why it would be wise not to be preoccupied by the question of whether the DA stays or goes, as far too many people — here at home and in the investment world — are. If the DA leaves, the government will not fall. Most importantly, Vulindlela, the structural reform programme first formed in 2018 when Ramaphosa came to power, and which is now yielding serious fruit, will continue on its steady way. 

Its success has nothing to do with the GNU — which is really just the cherry on the top of the cake. 

For three national and local elections in a row, electoral support for the DA has hovered around 21% to 22%. Electoral support for the DA has proved to be remarkably resilient — or stubbornly stuck, depending on how you care to look at it. Substantial growth is likely to remain elusive. The real battleground will continue to be for the remaining 80%, where Zuma and his band of criminal thugs are lurking with intent. 

The battle to hold the centre has only just begun. As one GNU insider puts it, “If the cherry goes, who will then eat the cake?”

Richard Calland is a visiting adjunct professor at the Wits School of Governance and a founding partner at political risk consultancy The Paternoster Group.

A recent Sunday Times article however goes well beyond fair public comment and provides an unbalanced and unfair view of the Competition Commission and commissioner Doris Tshepe, relying on anonymous sources. 

With the limited space available, we seek to set the record straight. 

The commission is accused of not delivering on its mandate, with the suggestion of negligence and underperformance. 

This is a surprising allegation, given a solid record of evidence of successes by the commission, including over the past two years. Three examples illustrate this.

In 2023, the commission initiated a complaint against Johnson & Johnson’s (J&J) in respect of its monopoly drug treating multi-drug resistant tuberculosis, which is prevalent in SA. J&J extended its patent in South Africa and globally, and raised the price to the department of health. Following this investigation, J&J announced it would not enforce its secondary patent in South Africa and 133 other low- and middle-income countries, thus opening the market for entry of generic manufacturers. J&J has also agreed to an approximately 40% price drop in South Africa, which has resulted in significant savings to the fiscus. 

In July 2023, the commission completed its first market inquiry into digital platforms conducted in line with the amendments to the Competition Act. Small distributors in townships provided evidence of how they were excluded from markets. The inquiry put in place remedies aimed at promoting inclusion and participation in the digital economy by new players and historically disadvantaged people. Google agreed to alter its search page to promote South African platforms. Booking.Com agreed to end both wide and narrow price parity for South African establishments. This has only been achieved in Germany and France. The value of these remedies to consumers and small businesses has been estimated at R1.1 billion, opening a key lifeline to many businesses who were constrained by unfair market features. 

Since September 2022, the commission finalised more than 560 mergers, including a number of complex mergers. The commission recommended prohibitions for three mergers, all of which were accepted by the Competition Tribunal. The merger conditions provided support of R2.2 billion to firms owned by historically disadvantaged people. Assets worth R37 billion were committed to the account of workers, through employee-shareholder commitments made by firms, in line with the law. An estimated 11 000 jobs were saved. 

The commission has referred more than six cases of abuse of dominance to the tribunal in key sectors of the economy. The commission’s performance has been steady at above 80% of performance target. It ended the 2023-24 financial year at 93% of target and is at 87% for the first two quarters of the 2024-25 financial year.

These achievements are the result of a professional, highly motivated and skilled staff complement, who deal with some of the most challenging parts of our law, and often where litigants against commission decisions are well-resourced. The characterisation of low staff morale is clearly at odds with the facts. The achievements are attained in tight fiscal conditions in which the commission constantly reviews areas in which to allocate resources and this too generates debates, as one can expect in an organisation.

The article repeats allegations previously ventilated about 10 months ago relating to internal staffing matters, and fully responded to by the commission at the time.

As in any large institution, there will be a diversity of views and the commissioner encourages debate and the ventilation of views, as this enhances the quality of the final decisions made by the institution. This is very different to the picture that has been painted and, in fact, the commission is proud of the space it provides for deep reflection and discussion.  

In trying to make a case, the article states that it relies on a copy of a letter to the then minister of trade, industry and competition from unnamed employees of the commission regarding the conduct of the commissioner. This includes questions relating to international travel. 

These allegations were dealt with at the time to the satisfaction of the then minister, Ebrahim Patel.

However, it is worth noting that the commission deals with an area of work that has significant international dimensions. First, many areas of the commission’s work relate to market conduct of global firms or transactions (such as mergers and cartel investigations) with cross-border implications. Competition regulators globally compare notes on ways to address such market conduct. Second, competition policy is shaped by global developments and thinking. An example is the focus on digital markets, where authorities as diverse as the United States, Kenya, Nigeria, India, China and the European Union are grappling with how to adjust conduct of competition policy to new market-dynamics. 

The commission contributes to these discussions and benefits from new insights and learnings. This requires travel to other jurisdictions by senior commission members, including the commissioner. 

The article repeats the Sunday World claims published 10 months ago regarding conflict of interest, and bases this on the fact that the commission had briefed advocate Ngwako Maenetje, the commissioner’s partner, as counsel in certain competition matters.

What do the facts indicate? 

Maenetje is a senior counsel practising at the Johannesburg Bar since 2000. He has acted as counsel for the commission in a number of cases from as early as 2002 representing the commission before the Competition Tribunal, the Competition Appeal Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court prior to the appointment of Doris Tshepe as a commissioner.

Since the appointment of Tshepe as the commissioner on 1 September 2022, the commission has not briefed Maenetje in any new matters. Currently, there are two pending matters in which he has been acting for the commission before the tribunal. Maenetje was appointed by former commissioners to act for the commission in these two pending matters.  These matters had not been finalised on 1 September 2022. Maenetje remained on brief on these matters at the request of the commission’s chief legal counsel.

Shortly after Tshepe assumed office as the commissioner, she informed Minister Patel at the time that Maenetje was on brief for the commission in pending matters in which he was briefed prior to her appointment.

The commissioner has recused herself from any decision making and any other act related to the pending matters. She does not approve invoices or give instructions related to payments of Maenetje’s invoices or their processing. 

The article criticises the commission for apparent late submission of its annual report. The facts are as follows. 

The commission submitted its draft annual financial statement (AFS) and performance information to the Auditor General of South Africa and the treasury on 31 May 2024 in line with the Public Finance Management Act. The auditor general submitted its audit report in September 2024 which provided the commission with a clean audit for the financial year 2023-24. This is a fifth consecutive clean audit outcome for the commission. The annual report has since been submitted to the trade, industry and competition department.  

In summary, fair and balanced reporting can enhance public discussions on the work of the commission. Publishing anonymous allegations and impugning the character of commission and the commissioner does not allow for fair and balanced public discourse.

Siyabulela Makunga is the spokesperson for the Competition Commission.

The boys were detained and tortured for 26 days by the dreaded Syrian secret police, Mukhabarat. Families and neighbours took to the streets, and soon word spread beyond Daraa, as more people rose to protest peacefully — only to be met by a relentless brutal crackdown.

Just 10km east of Daraa, on 29 April 2011, a curious 13-year-old boy, Hamza al-Khateeb, joined a crowd of people in Saida. He was arrested by an anti-terror squad along with 50 other demonstrators, and held in detention for almost a month before his mutilated body was delivered to his family on 24 May 2011, to serve as warning to all Syrians. 

Hamza’s limp remains showed signs of extreme torture. He had been shot in both arms, had burns and lacerations, his kneecaps were shattered, he appeared to have been subjected to electric shock, his neck was broken, and he had been castrated. 

His father was detained and threatened when he expressed grief and attempted to call for justice. Hamza’s death, meant to break the spirits of Syrians seeking change, ignited not just despair but incredible defiance. Youth took to the streets armed with roses and water as a gesture of peaceful protest, demanding an end to the tyrannical rule of Assad. Their spirits of hope were crushed as Assad unleashed his wrath and terror against his own people. 

His rule followed that of his father, Hafez al-Assad, an equally authoritarian president. Initially, Bashar had no ambitions for leadership and was pursuing medical studies abroad. On the death of his brother, he was recalled and groomed for succession. While the world expected a young Assad to take his country on a different trajectory to that of his father, the Syrian people were gravely disappointed to be met with much the same tyranny as they had lived under for decades. 

As pockets of resistance began to coordinate and develop militias, including defectors from the regime, Assad unleashed an onslaught of indiscriminate barrel bombs, mass arrests and slaughter to quash the uprising. He made little attempt to offer a conciliatory hand to the opposition, threatening them with the lives of their families — wives, siblings, children — to smoke them out. By 2012, a full-scale civil war engulfed the region, as the opposition began to seize cities in the north. From 2013 to 2015, there were at least two occasions that the Assad regime faced collapse, revealing his vulnerability without external support. 

Vested interests

Gulf countries with vested interests in supporting the revolutionary movements entered the space with funding and political support, including demands for Assad to step down. 

While it initially appeared that there would be success in overthrowing the dictator and formulating a democratic, unified Syria, the lack of common vision, unity and vastly differing political ideologies weakened the resistance while Assad sought help from his Iranian and Russian allies in their provision of air power and foot soldiers. On at least one occasion, Assad responded to the opposition with the use of chemical weapons, massacring swathes of civilians in Ghouta. 

The emergence of groups expressing loyalty to and affinity with the Islamic State and Al Qaeda cast a shadow on the revolutionary movement, because Assad and his allies claimed to be fighting terrorists. 

The United States opportunistically expanded its reach by occupying vast territory in the eastern region, rich in oil and gas, claiming to be quelling the Islamic State, while concurrently supporting a Kurdish movement. 

Türkiye advanced from the north to protect its territorial integrity, while battling the Kurdish Syrian Defence Force (SDF) perceived to be aligned with the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), deemed a terror organisation. 

Syria became a battleground for Syrians but a playground for international actors orchestrating proxy war games at the expense of the people. At least half a million Syrians were killed, and the largest refugee crisis emerged, with more than 14 million people displaced, seven million of whom sought asylum in neighbouring countries and beyond. 

Diplomatic efforts in Geneva and through the United Nations failed to deliver any meaningful progress, while the inept UN Security Council was once again immobilised by the misuse of the veto on several resolutions proposed, including that for no-fly zones and military intervention based on the responsibility to protect civilians. 

In 2015 and 2016, Russian military intervention intensified airpower. This, coupled with the ground support of Iran and Hizbollah, delivered the opportunity for Assad to consolidate his power and advance to reclaim the lost cities, while forcing the opposition into enclaves in the north, declared as Free Syria by revolutionary forces. 

In 2017, a trilateral forum initiated by Russia, Türkiye and Iran, and hosted by Kazakhstan was launched, presumably aimed at ending the armed conflict and restarting formal political negotiations. The talks were conducted under UN auspices, with Staffan de Mistura, the UN special envoy for Syria, and his successor, Geir Otto Pedersen, both affirming their commitments to the Astana process as an avenue for achieving peace. Syrians were sceptical, finding too strong a hand of the Russian and Iranian allies to Assad and fearing that it was a guise to disarm and isolate the opposition into “de-escalation zones”.

Rise of the revolutionaries

During the same year, several disparate opposition groups, including the previously Al Qaeda-linked Jabhat Al Nusra, reconstituted to form Hayat Tahrir Al Shaam (HTS), relinquishing ties to Al Qaeda, developing stronger political frameworks and formulating governance structures in the Free Syria regions. 

The HTS, led by Ahmad Al Sharaa (aka Abu Muhammed al Jolani), is the group largely responsible for the dramatic and swift deposing of Assad in under a fortnight, despite indications that Assad was reaffirmed as the Syrian leader by the Arab League after a decade of isolation. Assad’s comfort in believing he was untouchable was shattered as the HTS coordinated with other opposition groups, supported by Türkiye and with Russia and Iran standing down from their support of Assad due to their own frustrations with his obstinance. 

The surprise advance into Aleppo, followed by Hama and Homs, forced a rushed meeting of the Astana group in Doha, Qatar, a night before the opposition set their sights on Damascus. This sealed the fate of Assad, whose own troops mass defected, rendering him exposed — much like pictures of him found in his abandoned palace, wearing only underwear, earning him the name Abu Kalsoon (the father of knickers). His humiliating defeat not only laid bare his vulnerabilities, they uncovered his penchant for the macabre, as prisons with thousands of political prisoners were opened, revealing the horrors behind the concrete walls. 

The bloodletting

An almost bloodless coup has now affirmed the deluge of bloodletting by the Assad regime. For more than a decade, Syrian human rights organisations in exile highlighted the atrocities perpetrated by Assad against his people but the world turned a blind eye. The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) meticulously recorded the human rights violations by all parties to the conflict on a daily, monthly and annual basis. Regular reports focused on the disappearances, torture, deaths of civilians and attacks on vital infrastructure. These records displayed Assad as responsible for the greater number of human rights violations in comparison to groups such as the Islamic State. 

The Syrian Emergency Task Force (SETF) supported the detailed testimony of a former Syrian government official photographer, codenamed Caesar. He had been tasked with photographing and documenting the deaths from torture on behalf of the Syrian regime until he defected and escaped with the evidence of more than 50,000 photographs, presenting it before international human rights hearings. Following intensive lobbying by the SETF, the US enacted the Caesar Act, unilaterally imposing additional sanctions against Syria. 

But other countries failed to take any meaningful action. South Africa seemed to resign itself to blissful ignorance of the human rights abuses, while strongly aligning itself to the Assad regime.

With the HTS takeover of Damascus, unfathomable levels of depravity of the Assad regime have come to light. We now know that the young Hamza al-Khateeb was not an isolated case at the beginning of the revolution, but was habitual practice of slaughter, rape and torture. Assad’s labyrinth of gulags inspired by Nazi advisers to Adolf Eichmann, were long rumoured to have existed. Used as known black sights for renditions by the Americans in the “war on terror”, these torture chambers were thought to have been dark fantastical tales told to maintain a stronghold by the repressive regime. Somehow, Assad’s apparently geeky grin never gave any impression of the malevolence that lurked behind his rule nor that he was the mastermind executioner of his people. 

Human slaughterhouse

It was perhaps easy to dismiss the Caesar photographs as exaggeration — most would question why any regime would document its own crimes — but as the doors of Sednaya prison, branch 215 and the notorious Palestine Branch were opened to the world this week, a bizarre unveiling of meticulous records kept by the wardens present a perverse bureaucracy that seemingly took pride in their malice. 

Escapees from these dungeons, such as Omar Al Shogre, who was due for execution on the day of his release, have told their stories and described the inhumane conditions of these prisons. But it was not until the Syrian Civil Defence (White Helmets) drilled into the concrete floors, unearthing incarcerated souls held for up to 40 years without seeing the light of day, that the world began to take notice. 

Severely malnourished and confused skeletal humans emerged from the slaughterhouse. Women were held with children, apparently born of the rape their mothers endured at the hands of their captors. Hidden chambers, visible on camera but inaccessible were eventually excavated, along with cavities bearing nooses, iron presses that were thought to have been used for the disposing of bodies, vats of acid in which the bodies of people who succumbed to torture were probably disintegrated, and instruments used to gouge out eyes or dismember captives were found. 

More macabre was the fact that the torture of these inmates was allegedly broadcast on the Dark Web for financial gain. 

Upon release, most of the detainees scattered from fear, many of whom have lost their minds as a result of extreme torture. Comparisons have been made with Auschwitz and Stalin’s gulags. 

Thousands remain unaccounted for, as family members continue the search for them, scouring through documents, displaying their photographs in public squares, visiting morgues and hospitals, hoping their loved ones will return.

Graphic images of the recently dead piled up in the morgues convey similarities with the pictures Caesar smuggled out years ago, bearing visible signs of torture, many unrecognisable. More than 100,000 people are unaccounted for and may never be found, Fadel Abdel Ghany, of the SNHR, said in an emotional interview. 

This week, evidence of several mass graves has emerged across Syria, at least one believed to have tens of thousands of bodies, some state up to a hundred thousand, many marked with their prison numbers or names. The SNHR has issued a directive on how the evidence must be carefully preserved to not only ensure justice and accountability, but also give finality and closure to the families of the victims. 

What Next?

Such accountability will only be possible and measurable if Syria under the new interim administration, led by the HTS, is capable of maintaining stability, transforming the archaic bureaucracy, and forming an inclusive government. During this past week, indications are that the interim government is conciliatory, eager to work with former technocrats in a handover, while reaching out to Syrians in the diaspora, urging them to return and rebuild their country. With the mass infrastructure destruction over 13 years, an economy under sanctions in tatters, and a grieving nation, the task ahead is incredibly difficult. The HTS has begun reaching out and is already in diplomatic engagements with several countries in the region and beyond, including Russia and Iran (the former Assad allies). 

A regional meeting of Arab countries was held in Aqaba, without Syrian representation present, in an almost desperate attempt to prevent uprisings of a similar nature in neighbouring countries. The regional meeting affirmed their view that the UN Security Council Resolution 2254 must be the basis upon which Syria is rebuilt but many Syrians reject this notion, believing that the resolution was specifically meant for an era that included Assad and that this period has passed. They motivate for a Syrian-led process without external interference. 

While the HTS has made the commitment to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of militia groups, there remain risks of pockets of resistance and counter-revolutionary forces that may jeopardise stability. Israel has already violated international law by attacking defence and intelligence apparatuses in Syria and annexing further Syrian territory beyond the already occupied Golan Heights. Türkiye is also embroiled in a limited war along the border in the northeastern region and Damascus has yet to concretise a deal with the Kurdish SDF who are insistent on autonomy. Continued sanctions and the lack of access to their national resources still under American occupation may impede economic progress, which would be vital to post-war reconstruction and development. 

In commemoration of the beginnings of the revolution when protesters handed roses to their oppressors, Omar al-Shogre movingly called for a rose for every martyr. As the euphoric mood of freedom depresses into sombre reflection and immense loss, it is difficult to forget a note written in the diary of a Syrian child at the height of the war: 

“When the war is over in my country, we will close Syria’s doors and we will put a banner that says: No Entry. We will shed tears of joy alone, just like how we suffered our grief alone.”

Zeenat Adam is a former diplomat and international relations strategist.